This thesis is about the procreative moral responsibilities of prospective parents thatintend to conceive, and the role of a parental virtue approach in encouragingprospective parents to discharge these procreative responsibilities to their futurechild without legal enforcement, or policing preconception and pregnancy. Following an introduction, Chapter One considers if procreative moralresponsibilities exist, and if so, what they are.

It identifies and explores key examplesof procreative moral responsibilities. It addresses who has them, when, and why.

Ittackles the significance of the behaviour and character of prospective parents bothbefore conception and during pregnancy. It considers the significance of theintention to conceive and the proximity to conception in terms of relevant capacity(fertility) and behaviour.

It examines why the choice to continue a pregnancy toterm and the choice to conceive both create procreative moral responsibilities, andthe relevance of an account of parental virtue in this context. It explains whyprospective parents that intend to conceive have procreative moral responsibilities totheir future child that begin before conception.

Chapter Two addresses whether the procreative moral responsibilities of prospectiveparents are currently legally enforceable (in England and Wales) and whether theyshould be. It explains what enforcement means, and argues that enforcement is notcurrently within the role of the law or state.

As legal change is possible, it argues thatenforcement should not be within the role of the law for ethical, legal and societalreasons. Furthermore, it suggests that procreative moral responsibilities could not beenforced, because enforcement via surveillance, intervention or sanctions isimpractical.

Finally, the practical reasons against enforcement suggest that theseresponsibilities are unenforceable. .