This dissertation argues that ordinary language analysis offers a meansof critically evaluating substantive philosophical claims as well as providing a toolfor constructing answers to philosophical conundrums. It has been neglected due tosome powerful, though ultimately misguided, objections.

Those who calledthemselves ordinary language philosophers did not effectively explain ordefend their methodology and thus these objections were never adequately met. This dissertationarticulates and defends the methodology and its core theoretical commitments.

Ordinary language philosophy is essentially an empirical investigation intohow words are used in ordinary (non-philosophical) contexts. Some believed that wecould eliminate philosophical conundrums via such analysis.

Wittgenstein, forexample, thought that most philosophical problems were caused by linguisticconfusion. I argue that the methodology does have an important critical role to play,but I also believe that it can be an important tool in constructing genuine solutions toproblems.

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