This book offers the first comprehensive study of defence offsets and its economic, security, political and theoretical implications. Originating in the second half of the 19th century, defence offsets - additional economic, industrial and technological benefits to states for buying foreign weapons - have since been a key feature of the global arms trade and defence industry.

And yet, offsets are an under-researched and under-theorised phenomenon. This book fills this gap in the literature by offering the first general theory of defence offsets, as well as the first systematic analysis of the offset phenomenon.

By building on the insights of scholars of defence economics and drawing from the International Relations liberal paradigm, as well as reviving and adapting Robert Putnam’s two-level game framework, the book proposes a liberal-rationalist theory of defence offsets. It then proves the worth of such a theory through Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of fifty-four fighter aircraft transfers from 1992 to 2021 inclusive, and three in-depth case studies addressing offsets negotiated and agreed to as part of fighter aircraft competitions in Brazil, India, and South Korea.

This book will be of interest to students of defence studies, defence economics, security studies and international relations. .