The US group will be virtually powerless to prevent, delay or reverse China's efforts to unify Taiwan. The timing of this action in 2026 is right for China.

The US alliance will have to respond to China's reunification. The US response plan theoretically consists of two sets, a pre-event set and a post-event set, with a total of 6 toolkits.

In general, pre-event responses are more in the US national interest, but are not prioritised in practice. Post-event responses are usually much easier to implement.

Comprehensive political sanctions should form the basis of any post-event response plan. Economic sanctions are less risky than a military response.

But any plan short of military action will find it difficult to appease Western public opinion. The "weak plan" will not deter other potential rebel forces.

It will not effectively slow China's rapid expansion of geopolitical power. Military responses may score political points, but their risks remain.

Politicians on both sides of the Sino-US divide hope to keep military interactions in their hands at the level of "military appeasement". If they do so, the military appeasement plan will become a good tool to bring about a change in public opinion.

This transition helps to resume and promote successful comprehensive negotiations. Once a military operation is launched, it can escape the control of politicians.

The US can withdraw its political and military presence from East Asia once it enters a medium- to high-reaction war. A higher level of response may involve more variables.

They include a comprehensive border movement process in Europe; a deconstruction and reorganisation of the European political order; Russian eyes on the L1 line along the Denepor River; a great chaos in the European core and surrounding areas; and uncertainty about the options after a Sino-American war, etc. It will be difficult for the US group to defeat China militarily if China adopts an "offensive strategy with a defensive way".

Although China (group) has the potential to deconstruct the European order and the US-led imperial order, it may not have the initiative to exploit these potentials. It is not impossible to defeat China through conventional warfare in an ordinary style.

Breaking the ground rules of the imperial order and successfully implementing a pre-emptive containment plan will be a chance. However, the uncontrollable endpoint of this plan is the greatest obstacle to its implementation.

The early and rapid start of a nuclear war, or the start of a nuclear war after losing a comprehensive total war, will bring the possibility of military superiority to the American group. Once Western public opinion decides that this is the only way to succeed, it will be extremely difficult for Western politicians to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in war.

This fact determines that China must bear the main responsibility for preventing nuclear war. Building a comprehensive nuclear deterrent against the West is a responsibility that China must bear.

In the complex process of responding, Europe's stance on the Sino-US conflict will put enormous pressure on China. At the same time, it will bring great uncertainty to Europe's prospects.

Japan, South Korea and the Philippines will play different roles and have different effects at different stages of the military conflict between China and the United States. Taiwan is the most powerless participant in this series of events.

India is deeply hostile to China but lacks the capacity to mobilise China's political and military resources. Vietnam has the capacity to mobilise China's political and military resources.

Vietnam may also demonstrate this capacity, but under the constraints of the country's overall mature political understanding, Vietnam is unlikely to intervene in the military conflict between China and the United States. .